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Abstract
The public can now friend the White House and scores of agencies on social
networks, virtual worlds, and video-sharing sites. The Obama Administration
sees this trend as crucial to enhancing governmental transparency, public
participation, and collaboration. As the President has underscored, government
needs to tap into the public’s expertise because it does not have all of the answers.
To be sure, Government 2.0 might improve civic engagement. But it also
might produce privacy vulnerabilities because agencies often gain access to
individuals’ social-network profiles, photographs, videos, and contact lists when
interacting with them online. Little would prevent agencies from using and
sharing individuals’ social-media data for more than policymaking, including
law-enforcement, immigration, tax, and benefits matters. Although people may be
prepared to share their views on health care and the environment with agencies
and executive departments, they may be dismayed to learn that such policy
collaborations carry a risk of government surveillance.
This Essay argues that government should refrain from accessing
individuals’ social-media data on Government 2.0 sites. Agencies should treat
these sites as one-way mirrors, where individuals can see government’s activities
and engage in policy discussions but where government cannot use, collect, or
distribute individuals’ social-media information. A one-way mirror policy would
facilitate democratic discourse, enhance government accountability, and protect
privacy.
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Introduction
President Barack Obama has 1,867,060 MySpace friends,1 and Andy is
one of them.2 After the 2008 election, Andy hoped that his MySpace
friendship with the President would help him keep up with the
Administration’s policy endeavors. Andy’s profile included a variety of
personal information, including his hometown, birthday, political views,
friends, and interests. It featured photos of Andy’s recent trip to Tijuana,
Mexico and noted his enthusiasm for sales and gangster movies.
Unbeknownst to Andy, the Drug Enforcement Administration was
investigating a drug ring in his home town that maintains ties with dealers
in Tijuana, Mexico. In connection with the investigation, a data mining
program analyzed the profiles of the executive branch’s social network of
friends and identified Andy as a person of interest. Agents included Andy
in a drug-trafficking and terrorist watch list.3 Although Andy had no
connection to the drug ring, his inclusion on various watch lists cost him a
job offer and prevents him from traveling by airplane.
Although Andy’s predicament is hypothetical, the privacy risks
attendant to government’s use of social media are not. In January 2007,
Connecticut police arrested Ken Krayeske, a freelance journalist and law
student, during the gubernatorial inaugural parade.4 Police officers
recognized Mr. Krayeske from a Connecticut Intelligence Center security
bulletin. Law enforcement identified Mr. Krayeske as a potential threat
1

MySpace—Barack Obama, http://www.myspace.com/barackobama (last visited
Nov. 13, 2009).
2 Although Andy’s story is of my imagination, it may soon be routine if we permit
Government 2.0 to proceed unchecked.
3 Federal agencies share intelligence and information with state and federal agencies
and law enforcement through fusion centers, which facilitate the “information sharing
environment” mandated by Congress in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004. See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Fixing Fusion Centers: Restoring
Liberty and Enhancing Security in the Post-9/11 World 10 (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
4 Gerri Willis, Are You on the List?, CNN, Sept. 30, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/
video/#/video/crime/2009/09/30/willis.fusion.centers.cnn.
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based on his blog postings encouraging protests of the Governor’s
inaugural ball, his service as a Green Party candidate’s campaign manager,
and his previous arrest at an antiwar rally.5 After Mr. Krayeske spent
thirteen hours in jail, prosecutors dropped the charges.6 State legislators
and the Governor roundly criticized Mr. Krayeske’s arrest and appearance
on a threat list.7
Civic engagement could increasingly entail the risk of domestic
surveillance as government learns more about individuals’ online activities.
Unfortunately, Government 2.0 is no exception. In January 2009, President
Obama’s “Transparency and Open Government” memorandum ordered
executive departments and agencies to adopt new technologies that would
enhance governmental transparency, public participation, and
collaboration.8 True to this policy, the White House “stay[s] connected”
with the public through social-network sites, microblogging, and videosharing sites.9 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention provides
health information to the public via Facebook, YouTube, Flickr, and
Twitter.10 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration officials
interact with the public on a virtual island in Second Life.11
Government’s use of social media12 offers great promise. It allows
agencies and executive departments to reach millions of individuals at
trivial cost. It permits them to broadcast updates on pressing matters13 and

5 Gregory B. Hladky, Arrest Exposes State’s Threats List: Activist’s Rights
Trampled, Rell, State Lawmakers Say, NEW HAVEN REG., Jan. 9, 2007, at A1.
6 Id.
7 Jennifer Medina, Arrest of Activist Troubles Hartford Officials, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9,
2007, at B6.
8 Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009).
9 The White House, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2009) (urging
the public to connect with the White House on MySpace, Facebook, Twitter, iTunes,
YouTube, Vimeo, LinkedIn, and Flickr).
10 Social Media at CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/socialmedia/ (last visited Nov. 13,
2009).
11 Outreach at Earth System Research Laboratory, http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/outreach/
(last visited Nov. 13, 2009).
12 This Essay focuses on government’s use of social media, i.e., networked
technologies that enable the production and sharing of digital content in mediated social
settings. This characterization includes social-network sites where users post personal
information, view their network of relations to others, and communicate with others in their
network. See Frederic D. Stutzman & Woodrow N. Hartzog, Boundary Regulation in Social
Media 5–6 (Oct. 9, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); danah m. boyd &
Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship, 13 J.
COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 210, 211 (2008) (discussing social-network sites like
MySpace, Facebook, YouTube, Flickr, Bebo, LinkedIn, etc).
13 See Hilton Collins, Emergency Managers and First Responders Use Twitter and
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to post research data.14 It has the potential to facilitate discussions between
agencies and citizen-experts on policy matters15 and will surely entice
people who might otherwise not engage with government to join those
discussions.16 Indeed, the Administration has been successful in translating
the public’s embrace of networked technologies during the 2008
presidential campaign into an interest in interacting with the Administration
online.17
Government 2.0 sites depart from the traditional model of public
participation. In the past, individuals interacted with government in ways
that had little connection to their personal lives. They commented on
rulemakings, offered expert testimony, and participated in town hall
meetings. At present, people engage with government in networked
environments organized around social connections.18
As James
Grimmelmann has explored with great insight, social-network sites are
Facebook to Update Communities, EMERGENCY MGMT., July 27, 2009,
http://www.emergencymgmt.com/safety/Emergency-Managers-and-First.html.
14 See, e.g., Data.gov, http://www.data.gov/ (“The purpose of Data.gov is to increase
public access to high value, machine readable datasets generated by the Executive Branch of
the Federal Government.”).
15 BETH SIMONE NOVECK, WIKI GOVERNMENT: HOW TECHNOLOGY CAN MAKE
GOVERNMENT BETTER, DEMOCRACY STRONGER, AND CITIZENS MORE POWERFUL 20–21, 40–
42 (2009); Eric E. Holdeman, Opinion, Twitter: Five Lessons for Emergency Managers
from Iran, GOV’T TECH., June 23, 2009, http://www.govtech.com/gt/697201; see also
Danielle Keats Citron, Open Code Governance, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 355, 358 (2008)
(arguing that an open code model for governance can encourage public participation in the
administrative state, improve political accountability, and marshal expertise).
16 Many individuals might not have interacted with government about policy due to
the considerable transaction costs associated with writing letters, calling agency staffers, and
submitting comments on rulemaking. They also may have declined to do so due to their age
and life experiences. In the past, younger Americans may not have engaged with executive
agencies and the White House because government may have seemed too remote or
disinterested in their concerns. As the 2008 presidential election demonstrates, today’s
youth has become increasingly involved with political campaigns and government
decisionmaking, both offline and online.
17 The Pew Internet and American Life Project recently reported that thirty-seven
percent of social-network-site users expect updates from the Obama Administration via
social-network sites and thirty-four percent expect to hear from the Administration via
email. AARON SMITH, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, PEW INTERNET PROJECT DATA
MEMO 1 (2008), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2008/PIP_
Voter_Engagement_2008.pdf.pdf; see also AARON SMITH, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE
PROJECT, THE INTERNET’S ROLE IN CAMPAIGN 2008 (2009), available at
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2009/The_Internets_Role_in_Campaign
_2008.pdf (documenting the public’s avid involvement in the 2008 campaign).
18 See danah boyd, Friends, Friendsters, and Top 8: Writing Community into Being
on Social Network Sites, FIRST MONDAY, Dec. 4, 2006, http://firstmonday.org/htbin/
cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1418/1336 (suggesting that social-network sites
create a community through the process of “friending”).
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inherently social—individuals create their identities, cement relationships,
and accumulate social capital by revealing a wealth of personal
information.19 This imbues their interactions with a sense of trust and
confidentiality.20
Bringing government into these socially driven spaces presents new
Social-network sites facilitate two-way
challenges for privacy.21
interactions—agency “friends” have access to individuals’ profiles,
musings, photographs, videos, and miniblogs just as individuals can view
agencies’ postings.22
Nothing prevents agencies from collecting,
analyzing, and distributing individuals’ social-media data23 for law
enforcement, immigration, benefits determinations, and other purposes.
Nonetheless, individuals like Andy may be dismayed to learn that their
collaboration with the White House or a federal agency entailed the risk of
persistent government surveillance.
Some might attribute this problem to the convergence of the public and
private spheres and seek to resolve it with these concepts in mind.24 Yet
doing so may complicate matters more than it illuminates them. Because
the terms public and private lack intrinsic meaning, the boundary between
them is not sharp.25 As a result, discourse about public and private spheres
19

James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1159 (2009).
Id. at 1159–60. Social-network sites like MySpace and Facebook are less about
networking as they are about socializing inside of preexisting networks. danah boyd, Social
Media Is Here to Stay . . . Now What?, Feb. 26, 2009, http://www.danah.org/papers/talks/
MSRTechFest2009.html.
21 Although this Essay refers to microblogging sites like Twitter in passing, it does not
focus on them as they may engender privacy norms that differ from social-network sites and
the like. Compare danah boyd, supra note 20 (explaining that Twitter users see their
activities as involving the “public square” and hope to garner the attention of the wider
public), with Stutzman & Hartzog, supra note 12, at 13 (explaining that individuals often
maintain separate work and personal Twitter accounts due to privacy concerns).
22 As Part I explains, social-media providers treat agencies like any other users of
their service, thus permitting them to access their friends’ social-media information if their
privacy settings permit. To date, only Facebook does not follow this model; instead,
agencies generate “fans,” not friends, there. While agency Facebook “fans” can comment
on an agency’s postings and interact on live chats about policymaking, government cannot
view their fans’ profiles in their entirety.
23 The Essay uses the terms social-media data, social-network information, and
social-network data interchangeably to refer to information revealed on social-media sites
that does not involve feedback on policy matters.
24 See ARISTOTLE, Book 1, in POLITICS 3–13 (H. Rackham trans., Harvard Univ. Press
1944) (1932) (explaining his concept of the public state and the private family); JOHN
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 68–74 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books 1974) (1859)
(discussing the interaction between the struggle of liberty—the private self—and
authority—the public sphere).
25 Duncan Kennedy has explained that the public/private distinction is so incoherent
20
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focuses on a multitude of concepts, some overlapping, making it difficult to
categorize many circumstances.26 A public/private binary also may not
accord with our lived experiences—individuals routinely carve out zones of
privacy in so-called public spaces.27 Thus, notions of the public and the
private may not provide an effective tool to resolve Government 2.0’s
privacy dilemma.
This Essay argues that government should refrain from accessing
individuals’ social-media data. It contends that government should view
Government 2.0 sites as one-way mirrors, where individuals can see
government’s activities and engage in policy discussions but where
government cannot use, collect, or distribute individuals’ social-media
information. This would advance the goals of open government. Strong
privacy rules enhance deliberative democracy by encouraging participation
and by discouraging self-censorship.
I.

What Is Government 2.0?

President Obama is widely known as the “first tech president,”28 and
his “Open Government” initiative demonstrates this moniker’s accuracy.29
On January 21, 2009, the President ordered executive departments and
agencies to adopt “new technologies” that would “put information about
their operations and decisions online” and improve the public’s ability to
participate and collaborate in policymaking.30 The President has urged the
adoption of social media because “government does not have all the
answers and public officials need to draw on what citizens know.”31 Social
that it cannot help us describe, explain, or justify anything. Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of
the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982).
26 Alan Freeman & Elizabeth Mensch, The Public-Private Distinction in American
Law and Life, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 237, 247–50 (1987) (arguing that the public/private
distinction collapses on itself, has no objective content, and is incoherent). For example, the
economy involves the public arena for some; it implicates the private sphere for others. Id.
at 250–52.
27 Cf. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN
AMERICA 66–70 (2001) (noting that employees create privacy spaces in public workplaces).
Stutzman and Hartzog argue that social-network sites defy the public/private
categorization—users have privacy expectations that instead fall along a continuum, from
complete anonymity, to practical obscurity, to complete transparency. Stutzman & Hartzog,
supra note 12, at 14.
28 Chris Snyder, Government Agencies Make Friends with New Media, WIRED, Mar.
25, 2009, http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/03/government-agen/.
29 Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009); see also
Macon Phillips, WhiteHouse 2.0, posting to The White House Blog (May 1, 2009, 14:03
EDT), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/09/05/01/WhiteHouse/.
30 Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009).
31 Beth Noveck, Enhancing Citizen Participation in Decision-Making, posting to The
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media provides government with an inexpensive way to garner the
expertise and feedback of millions of individuals.32
Government 2.0 permits a “two-way interaction between government
and its citizens” through online comments, live chats, and message
threads.33 For instance, the President’s Facebook page asks: “Have
thoughts on the President’s priorities on science and technology? Join the
live chat.”34 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”)
explains to subscribers and friends on its YouTube video channel that it
hopes to provide the public with a chance “to see how FEMA operates in
communities across America, comment on disaster response and recovery,
and learn how to prepare homes and communities for all hazards.”35 The
State Department connects with the public on LinkedIn36 and maintains an
embassy in Second Life.37
States, municipalities, and emergency providers have embraced social
media as well.38 For instance, the Los Angeles Fire Department distributes
videos to friends and subscribers on YouTube, befriends citizens on
MySpace, and urges users to share photos and videos on Facebook.39
Generally, the government interacts with social-media users just as any
individual participant would. Social-network sites like MySpace provide
White House Blog (June 10, 2009, 13:08 EDT), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/Enhan
cing-Citizen-Participation-in-Decision-Making/.
32 Facebook now has 250 million members. Caroline McCarthy, Facebook Hits a
Quarter Billion Users, CNET NEWS (July 15, 2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13577_310287336-36.html. MySpace has 100 million members. Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F.
Supp. 2d 843, 851 n.8 (W.D. Tex. 2007); see also Jon Swartz, MySpace Cranks Up Heat In
Facebook Turf War, USA TODAY (Dec. 23, 2007). They have different audiences in these
networked environments—MySpace and Facebook communities tend to have different
socio-economic backgrounds, ages, nationalities, etc. See danah boyd, supra note 20.
33 Saul Hansell, The Nation’s New Chief Information Officer Speaks, posting to The
New
York
Times
Bits
Blog
(Mar.
5,
2009,
14:57
EST),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/05/the-nations-new-chief-information-officer-speaks/.
34 The White House, posting to Facebook—The White House (Aug. 6, 2009, 14:20
EST), http://www.facebook.com/WhiteHouse.
35 YouTube—FEMA’s Channel, http://www.youtube.com/user/fema?blend=1&ob=4
(last visited Nov. 13, 2009). The Federal Trade Commission has a YouTube channel as
well. YouTube—FTCvideo’s Channel, http://www.youtube.com/user/FTCvideos (last
visited Nov. 13, 2009).
36 U.S.
Department
of
State
Company
Profile,
LinkedIn,
http://www.linkedin.com/companies/u.s.-department-of-state (last visited Nov. 13, 2009).
37 L. Gordon Crovitz, Opinion, From Wikinomics to Government 2.0, WALL ST. J.,
May 12, 2008, at A13.
38 See Hilton Collins, Emergency Managers and First Responders Use Twitter and
Facebook
to
Update
Communities,
GOV’T
TECH.,
July
27,
2009,
http://www.govtech.com/gt/701799.
39 Id.
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agencies access to individuals’ personal information (assuming their
privacy settings permit) and vice versa. Agencies might be able to view
individuals’ videos, photographs, political and religious affiliations, and
revealing commentary. Video-sharing sites like YouTube operate in a
similar way. Agencies can see information and videos that friends and
subscribers share with others.40 By contrast, the social-network site
Facebook designates the friends of government agencies and corporations
as fans whose social-media information cannot be accessed.41
Government 2.0 certainly has potential to heighten the public’s
awareness of, and ability to provide feedback on, policymaking. Caution
is, however, in order. Social-media scholar Clay Shirky warns that
government’s rush to adopt Web 2.0 technologies may end in
“catastrophe.”42 The next Part addresses what Shirky may have been
alluding to—the privacy risks of Government 2.0.
II.

The Privacy Risks of Government 2.0

Civic engagement and privacy have long enjoyed an uneasy
relationship. Working for a political advocacy group might expose one’s
policy views to interested agencies, but it also might unexpectedly lead to
the release of sensitive personal information to the government. This
phenomenon was true during the 1950s and 1960s when officials in the
South sought the names and addresses of NAACP members43 and when the
Federal Bureau of Investigation spied on activists in the civil rights and
anti-Vietnam War movements whom it viewed as threats to national
security.44
This risk has continued into the twenty-first century. In 2005 and
2006, Maryland State Police officers conducted surveillance of human
rights groups, peace activists, and death penalty opponents to identify
potential “threats.”45 The investigation resulted in the classification of
fifty-three nonviolent political activists as “terrorists,” including two
40 Saul Hansell, Should the White House Be a Place for Friends?, posting to The New
York
Times
Bits
Blog
(May
4,
2009,
10:24
EDT),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/04/should-the-white-house-be-a-place-for-friends/.
41 Id.
42 Interview of Clay Shirky with Meet the Innovators (June 15, 2009),
http://media.bonnint.net/wtop/15/1560/156071.mp3 (available online in mp3 format).
43 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 453, 466 (1958) (striking down Alabama court
order requiring NAACP to produce list of its members on the grounds that privacy in group
association is indispensable to preserving the freedom to associate).
44 WARD CHURCHILL & JIM VANDER WALL, THE COINTELPRO PAPERS 95, 165–66
(1990).
45 Nick Madigan, Spying Uncovered, BALT. SUN, July 18, 2008, at 1A.
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Catholic nuns and a former Democratic candidate for local office.46 More
recently, the Missouri fusion center47 issued a report discussing the modern
militia movement in which it suggested to law-enforcement officials that
these “extremists” are supporters of third-party candidates like Ron Paul
and Bob Barr.48 Individuals labeled as extremists did little more than
affiliate with groups opposed to government policy.49
Government 2.0 could contribute to this trend. While social media
permits individuals to provide feedback to government on policymaking, it
also provides government access to their social-media data, including their
group affiliations and other sensitive information. Unlike the civil rights
activists of the 1950s, who surely would not have willingly provided
Southern officials access to their personal information, individuals today
establish online connections with government that make them vulnerable to
surveillance. Government could, in fact, learn more about individuals from
Government 2.0 sites than it could from traditional law-enforcement tactics
given the breadth of personal information that individuals voluntarily
reveal online.50 This Part explores the nature of Government 2.0’s privacy
risks and why individuals often fail to appreciate them. It concludes by
exploring current law’s inability to adequately address these concerns.
A.

Privacy Harms

Government 2.0 sites can interfere with individuals’ privacy in various
ways. Agencies may use individuals’ social-media information for
purposes other than garnering feedback on policy. A party can intrude on
46 Bob Drogin, Spying on Pacifists: Greens and Nuns, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2008, at
A18, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/dec/07/nation/na-cop-spy7; Lisa Rein,
Maryland Police Surveillance Listed Some Activists as Terrorists, WASH. POST, Oct. 8,
2008, at B1.
47 See supra note 3.
48 MISSOURI INFO. ANALYSIS CTR., MIAC STRATEGIC REPORT: THE MODERN MILITIA
MOVEMENT (2009), available at http://www.firearmscoalition.org/images/news/miacmilitia-2009.pdf.
49 Chad Livengood, Agency Apologizes for Militia Report on Candidates,
SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER (Mo.), Mar. 25, 2009, at 1A. The fusion center intended the
report only for the eyes of police officers—it was made public after being leaked on the
Internet. Id. The fusion center apologized to former presidential candidates Ron Paul, Bob
Barr, and Chuck Baldwin for linking them to the modern militia movement in the report. Id.
The Missouri fusion center has ceased distribution of the February 20, 2009 report. Chad
Livengood, State Retracts Militia Report, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER (Mo.), Mar. 26, 2009,
at 1A.
50 While a traditional investigation might require police to obtain a warrant to gain
access to sensitive personal information residing on a person’s computer, for instance, there
is no such requirement for Government 2.0 sites, which may give government access to
similarly revealing personal information that individuals voluntarily post.
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another’s privacy by using information for “purposes unrelated to the
purposes for which the data was initially collected without the data
subject’s consent.”51 Daniel Solove’s insightful taxonomy of privacy
problems describes this as a “secondary use” privacy intrusion.52
Rather than using a person’s social-media data for policymaking
purposes, executive departments and agencies could share it with lawenforcement, immigration, and tax authorities.53 This possibility is not
remote. Law enforcement regularly analyzes social-network information to
identify criminals, terrorists, and other threats.54 Police departments
reportedly have a constant presence on MySpace and Facebook to identify
sex offenders, murderers, and other criminals.55 For instance, detectives in
Auburn, Maine explain that they obtain “photos of crimes” that suspects
post on their social-network profiles.56 Denver’s Joint Information Center
monitored social-network sites and blogs during the 2008 Democratic
National Convention to gain intelligence on potential saboteurs.57
The intelligence community has expressed interest in following law
enforcement’s lead. The National Security Agency has funded research on
the production of intelligence from social-network data.58 Although
51

DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 131 (2008).
Id. at 129–33; see Danielle Keats Citron & Leslie Meltzer Henry, Visionary
Pragmatism and the Value of Privacy in the Information Age, 108 MICH. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2010) (reviewing Daniel J. Solove’s Understanding Privacy).
53 It is crucial to note that nothing suggests that agencies have already engaged in such
secondary use of their friends’ social-media data. This Essay urges government to adopt
policies that would preclude this possibility, which the law, to date, largely does not.
54 Citron & Pasquale, supra note 3, at 12–13.
55 Jim McKay, The New Neighborhood Watch, GOV’T TECH., Sept. 2009, at 24. In the
Netherlands, law enforcement agencies use social-network data to learn about criminal
activity and to monitor affiliates of known criminals. Joseph Bonneau et al., Prying Data
out of a Social Network (2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.cl.cam.
ac.uk/~jra40/publications/2009-ASONAM-prying-data.pdf.
56 McKay, supra note 55, at 28.
I use this example not to suggest that law
enforcement may never use social-network data in their investigations. Quite the contrary.
As Part III discusses, the one-way mirror policy ought to be cabined to instances where
government uses social-network sites to garner feedback on government policy and to
engage citizens in democratic discourse. Government could use other social-network data
for investigative purposes if the law so permits.
57 Jeannette Sutton, The Public Uses Social Networking During Disasters to Verify
TECH.,
July
30,
2009,
Facts,
Coordinate
Information,
GOV’T
http://www.govtech.com/gt/706523. It appears that the Denver fusion center obtained
social-media data from the Internet, i.e., information that individuals released to the public
through blogging and social-network sites. This example demonstrates law enforcement’s
use of social-media data generally, not the sharing of Government 2.0 data with fusion
centers and the like.
58 Paul Marks, Pentagon Sets Its Sights on Social Networking Sites, NEW SCIENTIST,
52
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individuals may be prepared to tell the White House their views about
health care or the environment, they may not expect the agency to collect
and distribute their social-media data for other purposes.
An agency’s secondary use of social-media data could have harmful
consequences. Individuals may face erroneous arrests.59 For example,
British police mistakenly arrested the host of a birthday party after he
invited seventeen friends to an “all-night party” on Facebook.60 Officers
identified the Facebook posting as important evidence that the party might
turn into an illegal rave or music festival.61 Individuals could also be
incorrectly placed on watch lists.62 They might be denied government
benefits or asylum if the government mistakenly determines that their
social-media data contradicts information provided on their applications.
To make matters worse, law enforcement could distribute such
erroneous designations to countless other public and private actors through
the information-sharing environment, compounding the error in ways that
are difficult to detect and eliminate.63 Once social-media data makes its
way to other entities’ databases, it can be used in disadvantageous ways.
This is especially likely as the information has been taken out of its original
context and thus is subject to misinterpretation.64
Government could also use social-media data to identify sensitive
information about individuals, including their group associations and
sexual orientation.65 Although individuals might deliberately avoid
June 9, 2006, http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg19025556.200-pentagon-sets-itssights-on-social-networking-websites.html?full=true.
59 See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text (discussing the arrest of Ken Krayeske
at a gubernatorial inaugural parade in Connecticut because law enforcement identified him
as a potential threat due to his blog posts urging others to protest the parade, work on Green
Party campaigns, and prior arrest at an antiwar rally).
60 Police Pay Flying Visit to Halt 30th Birthday Party, TIMES (London), July 17,
2009, at 27.
61 Id. According to the host, the police arrived in a helicopter to “stop 15 people
eating burgers.” Id.
62 See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249,
1274–75 (2008) (discussing the misidentifications that occur because of the “No Fly”
computer matching system).
63 Citron & Pasquale, supra note 3.
64
See Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2010) (exploring the reputational damage inflicted when information is read
online out of its original context).
65 This concern might apply to social-network sites that permit users to become fans
of government agencies if government can access the names of their fans’ friends, which it
appears that Facebook does. See Facebook Help Center, http://www.facebook.com/help/
?faq=12277 (last visited Nov. 13, 2009) (“Pages cannot see the profiles of their fans. They
can only see the profile photo and the name of each of their fans.”); see also Bonneau et al.,
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including this information in their profiles, the government could infer
these excluded details by looking at the information imparted by others in
their social network.66 For instance, a student experiment at Massachusetts
Institute of Technology demonstrated the ease with which a person’s sexual
orientation can be identified by examining a person’s online friends.67
Using publicly available data from Facebook, a software program
determined if a person was gay based on the gender and sexuality of that
person’s friends.68 Although the student researchers had no way of
checking all of their predictions, their computer program appeared accurate
based on their outside knowledge.69
Even if individuals decline to reveal sensitive information online,
agencies could employ computer algorithms that infer such information
about them based on their social contacts. Agencies could identify a
person’s involvement in unpopular groups.70 They could also make
assumptions about individuals that are incorrect. As Katharine Strandburg
explores in her insightful work, individuals might face surveillance based
on their legitimate associations.71 They might, in turn, refrain from joining
certain groups and causes to avoid arousing suspicion.72 The possibility of
government surveillance might chill identity-forming and expressive
activities.73
Furthermore, an agency’s friendship with one user may have privacy

supra note 55.
66 Grimmelmann, supra note 19, at 1174.
67 Carolyn Y. Johnson, Project ‘Gaydar,’ BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 20, 2009, at K1,
available at http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles/2009/09/20/project_gaydar_
an_mit_experiment_raises_new_questions_about_online_privacy?mode=PF.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First
Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 759–60 (2008).
71 Id.
72 Individuals may find it easier to censor themselves than to de-friend an agency or
executive department. Individuals also may be unaware that they could de-friend an
agency.
73 DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 525–26 (3d ed.
2009). Christopher Slobogin has argued that governmental surveillance of expressive
activities, such as a speech at a park rally, can chill conduct, even though it takes place in
public and is meant to be seen by others. Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera
Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 253–55
(2002). As Solobogin recognized, the Supreme Court rejected a similar assertion in Laird v.
Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972). Id. Nonetheless, Laird might not foreclose a First Amendment
argument against automated surveillance if social-network-site users appreciated the risk, as
it might present a direct “compulsion” against speech acts that the First Amendment would
prohibit. Id.
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consequences for others.74 Agencies could gain access to social-network
data of their contacts’ contacts.75 James Grimmelmann explains this
phenomenon: “[i]f Hamlet and Gertrude are contacts, then when Gertrude
accepts Claudius’s contact request, she may compromise Hamlet’s privacy
from Claudius.”76 Such privacy spillover may result in government’s use,
collection, and distribution of someone’s contacts’ social-network
information. This spreads the web of individuals whose privacy loss may
lead to a false arrest, inclusion on a watch list, or denial of government
benefits.77
Finally, the government’s use of social-media data may defy the
privacy norms of Web 2.0 site users. Helen Nissenbaum’s theory of
contextual integrity bases privacy protections on the norms of particular
contexts.78 It assesses the kind of information that users share in certain
arenas and the typical flow of information there.79 As the next Part
explores, government’s use of individuals’ social-media data for nonpolicy
purposes would transgress the norms of information flow in social-network
sites.
B.

Individuals’ Privacy Expectations for Government 2.0

Individuals who interact with government on social-media sites fail to
appreciate their privacy risks and do not expect government to pay
attention to, let alone use, their social-media data. People participate in
social-network sites for social reasons.80 They reveal personal information
as a means to say who they are, make new friends, and cement personal
connections.81 In doing so, people underestimate social media’s privacy
74

See Grimmelmann, supra note 19, at 1174–75.
This is true if the privacy settings of government’s contacts’ contacts permit. Many
people allow friends of friends to see their profiles. See id. at 1174. Indeed, some permit
anyone living in their geographic area to see their profiles. On the other end, some only
allow friends to do so. Research suggests that some users do not use these settings at all, id.
at 1185, meaning that the social-network site’s default privacy rules govern who can view
their profile (which is often not protective of users’ privacy).
76 Id. at 1174.
77 See id. at 1174–75.
78 HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 6–7 (2009); Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity,
79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 138–40 (2004) [hereinafter Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual
Integrity]. Daniel Solove offers a comprehensive, pragmatic theory of privacy that requires
decisionmakers to balance the multitude of interests at stake in a given situation. SOLOVE,
supra note 51, at 87–88.
79 Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, supra note 78, at 138–40.
80 Grimmelmann, supra note 19, at 1151.
81 Id.; see also danah boyd & Jeffrey Heer, Profiles as Conversation: Networked
75
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risks because social-network sites engender feelings of trust.82 Seeing
contacts’ names and pictures conveys the notion that users are engaging in
“a private space, closed to unwanted outsiders.”83
People also have a sense that their social-network information will be
kept private because they feel anonymous amidst the millions of socialnetwork users.84 As noted social-media researcher danah boyd explains,
social-network participants “live by security through obscurity, where they
assume that as long as no one cares about them, no one will come
knocking.”85 They operate under the assumption that only close friends
will pay close attention to their online activities.86 Notably, social-network
users fail to appreciate how many people can, and do, access their
information.87 For this reason, the possibility of future employers,
government, or corporations reading their profiles seems remote.88 As
James Grimmelmann explains, the design of social-network environments
effectively impairs individuals’ ability to appreciate their privacy risks.89
The public’s initial reaction to Facebook’s adoption of “News Feed”
seems to illustrate the point. The News Feed feature permitted users to see
every act taken by all of their friends—who befriended whom, what
Identity Performance on Friendster (Jan. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://vis.berkeley.edu/papers/friendster_profiles/2006-Friendster-HICSS.pdf.
82 Grimmelmann, supra note 19, at 1160–64
83 Id. at 1162.
84 Id. at 1161–62. My previous work Cyber Civil Rights explores how an online
group’s feeling of anonymity breeds destructive behavior online. Danielle Keats Citron,
Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 81–84 (2009).
85 danah boyd, Social Network Sites: Public, Private, or What?, 13 THE KNOWLEDGE
TREE 4, 7 (2007), http://kt.flexiblelearning.net.au/tkt2007/wp-content/uploads/2007/05/
edition_13.pdf.
86 Grimmelmann, supra note 19, at 1161.
87 Id. at 1168.
88 Zeynep Tufekci, Can You See Me Now? Audience and Disclosure Regulation in
Online Social Network Sites, 28 BULL. SCI., TECH. & SOC’Y 20, 31 (2008). This view is of
course mistaken—more than half of all employers check a person’s social-network activities
in making interviewing and hiring decisions. A 2006 survey of 100 executive recruiters
reported that 77% of recruiters used search engines to find background data on candidates
and 35% eliminated a candidate based on what they uncovered. Casting a Digital Shadow;
Your Reputation Precedes You, http://www.briansolis.com/2009/07/casting-a-digitalshadow-your-reputation-precedes-you (July 17, 2009, 07:54 EDT). Ralph Gross attributes
people’s willingness to divulge a wealth of personal information on social-network sites to a
herd effect—they see others doing so and follow their lead. Ralph Gross et al., Information
Revelation and Privacy in Online Social Networks (The Facebook Case) 80 (Nov. 7, 2005)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/papers/privacyfacebook-gross-acquisti.pdf.
89 Grimmelmann, supra note 19, at 1162. Because Government 2.0 is so new, social
scientists have yet to study individuals’ privacy expectations associated with it.
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someone wrote on another’s wall, the new groups someone joined, etc.—
when signing onto the site.90 Immediately thereafter, over 700,000 users
joined the Students Against Facebook News Feed group.91 Although
Facebook users could discover this information by visiting their friends’
profiles, they opposed News Feed because it made them feel exposed,
much like a person in a room with loud music would feel if someone turned
the music off unexpectedly and others could hear her talking loudly.92
Facebook users disliked how News Feed informed all of their friends about
their activities.93 News Feed felt like an intrusion—individuals did not
expect, or want, acquaintances to check their profiles closely.94 It also
offended users’ sense of control over their information, and Facebook’s
refusal to notify them before its adoption no doubt angered them further.95
This research provides insight into individuals’ privacy expectations
for Government 2.0. When individuals see President Barack Obama’s
smiling face on MySpace, they may experience feelings of trust. This is
true not only because people feel that they know politicians,96 but also
because Government 2.0 sites suggest that agencies are only interested in
the public’s policy views. When the President tells social-network users
that their views matter to him, he sends the message that government wants
their policy feedback. Nothing informs individuals that government desires
their social-media data for purposes other than policymaking, such as law
enforcement.
Online commentary provides anecdotal support for this notion. In
describing Government 2.0, a commentator wrote: “While the UK Home
Office is planning to gain access to social-networking sites to snoop on its
citizens, the Obama administration seeks to use the same technology to
engage with voters [and] find out what they want.”97 Moreover, socialnetwork users may believe that the President and government agencies will
not scrutinize their profiles because they expect nonintimate friends to
refrain from monitoring their online activities.
90

danah boyd, Facebook’s Privacy Trainwreck: Exposure, Invasion, and Social
Convergence, 14 CONVERGENCE 13, 13 (2008).
91 Id.
92 Id. at 14–15.
93 Id. at 15.
94 Id. at 13–14. In an ironic but perhaps expected turn of events, News Feed is now
one of Facebook’s most popular features.
95 I thank Woody Hartzog for this insightful point.
96 Lawrence M. Friedman, The One-Way Mirror: Law, Privacy, and the Media, 82
WASH. U. L.Q. 319, 327 (2004).
97 Anonymous,
posting to eParticipation (Mar. 27, 2009, 19:54 EDT),
http://eparticipation.com/content/government-agencies-use-social-networking-sites.
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To be sure, users might anticipate the possibility that a government
friend might randomly notice their personal data while assessing their
feedback on policy. But they would not expect government to collect, use,
and distribute it systematically to law-enforcement, immigration, tax, and
other government authorities. Individuals share personal information on
social-network sites to develop relationships, not because they want
government to use it for law enforcement, taxation, and beyond. This
distinction is crucial to understanding individuals’ privacy expectations in
Government 2.0.
Moreover, social-network sites do little to counteract individuals’
mistaken impressions—they hide any mention of privacy and underscore
the benefits of disclosing personal data.98 They make privacy less salient to
maximize information disclosure on their sites.99 This may explain why
individuals fail to change a social-media site’s default privacy settings,
which are designed to maximize the visibility of users’ profiles.100 In short,
individuals may be unable to appreciate the great differences between
befriending individuals and government agencies and may fail to
understand the privacy risks engendered by Government 2.0.
C.

Absence of Robust Legal Protections

Our current legal framework cannot adequately address these privacy
concerns. In May 2009, the General Service Administration (“GSA”)
entered into terms-of-service agreements with social-network sites, such as
MySpace, Facebook, and YouTube.101 GSA officials explain that they had
no opportunity to raise privacy concerns in their negotiations, as they had
so little bargaining power vis-à-vis social-network providers who had little

98

Joseph Bonneau & Soren Preibusch, The Privacy Jungle: On the Market for Data
Protection in Social Networks 29–30 (2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://preibusch.de/publications/Bonneau_Preibusch__Privacy_Jungle.pdf; Bruce Schneier,
Facebook Should Compete on Privacy, Not Hide It Away, GUARDIAN (U.K.), July 15, 2009,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/jul/15/privacy-internet-facebook.
99 Richard Goettke & Joseph Christiana, Privacy and Online Social Networking
Websites
2
(May
14,
2007)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://www.eecs.harvard.edu/cs199r/fp/RichJoe.pdf. Privacy information does not appear
anywhere on the MySpace homepage, and although it allows users to change their settings,
it is not user-friendly. Id. at 4. Social-network sites also discourage users from invoking
restrictive privacy settings; they tell users that doing so would “make it more difficult for
[them] to network with their friends.” Id. at 2.
100 Gross et al., supra note 88.
101 Jeff Chester, Federal Gov’t (GSA) Refuses to Make Public Agreements with
Facebook, MySpace, etc., posting to Digital Destiny (Apr. 30, 2009, 13:38 EDT),
http://www.democraticmedia.org/jcblog/?p=801; Snyder, supra note 28.
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desire to host government sites.102 The agreements only tackled issues that,
if omitted, would have precluded the government from using socialnetwork sites, such as indemnification, jurisdiction, intellectual property,
and advertising.103
Federal law provides little protection from Government 2.0’s privacy
risks. The Privacy Act of 1974 sets the basic conditions under which the
federal government collects, uses, and discloses personally identifiable
information.104 It covers “systems of records” under agency control,105
including those administered by private companies on the government’s
behalf.106 The Privacy Act, however, does not apply if the government
accesses information gathered by third parties, such as commercial data
brokers.107 Because the government would retrieve individuals’ network
data from third-party sites in a manner akin to its retrieval of information
from data-broker databases, the Privacy Act may not apply here.
Conversely, the Privacy Act would apply to social-media data
incorporated into an agency’s own system of records. That protection,
however, may provide little help to individuals like Andy, as the Privacy
Act largely exempts information used, collected, and distributed for
intelligence and criminal investigations from its requirements.108 In that
case, individuals enjoy limited access, accuracy, and correction rights visà-vis their personal information.109
The E-Government Act of 2002 updated the Privacy Act by requiring
agencies to conduct privacy impact assessments (“PIAs”) when developing
102 David Temoshok, Presentation at the U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security,
Government 2.0: Privacy and Best Practices Workshop 157 (June 22, 2009), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_gov20_June2009_transcripts_day1.pdf.
103 Id. at 157–59.
104 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006).
105 See Letter from Daniel J. Chenok, Chairman of Info. Sec. & Privacy Advisory Bd.,
to Peter Orszag, Dir. of Office of Mgmt. & Budget 11 (May 27, 2009) available at
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/ispab/documents/correspondence/ispab-reportmay2009.pdf.
106 5 U.S.C. § 552a(m).
107 Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other
Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J.
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595, 595–97 (2004).
108 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k).
109 Id.
The Privacy Act precludes agencies from collecting information that
exclusively concerns individuals’ First Amendment activities. That restriction does not,
however, apply when the information gathered addresses more than just the person’s speech
acts. In turn, its protections, in practice, reach too few scenarios, as law enforcement
routinely collects, uses, and distributes information relevant to far more than a person’s
political, religious, and other expressive activities. Andy’s experience demonstrates the
point.
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or procuring information technology systems that include personally
identifiable information.110 The Office of Management and Budget
(“OMB”) guidelines allow agencies to exempt government’s use of private
sector databases from the requirement to conduct PIAs when the data is not
“systematically incorporate[d] into existing information system
databases.”111 The E-Government Act does not apply to information
generated on social-network sites if agencies decline to incorporate
individuals’ social-network information into their databases. If, however,
an agency systematically downloads the social-media data of more than ten
people, it would be obliged to produce a privacy-impact-assessment
report.112 This certainly could provide considerable protection for
individuals if the agency made clear that it would not access or use
individuals’ social-media data for purposes other than getting feedback on
policymaking. To date, no such privacy impact assessments exist.
III. Protecting Privacy and Enhancing Civic Engagement with a
One-Way Mirror Policy
This Part begins by proposing a one-way mirror policy that would
permit individuals to provide feedback to government but would prevent
government from using, collecting, or distributing individuals’ socialmedia information. Then, it demonstrates how this approach can protect
privacy and advance the animating principles of the Open Government
initiative—governmental transparency, participation, and collaboration. It
ends by countering important critiques of this approach.
A.

The One-Way Mirror Proposal

Government 2.0’s privacy policy should resemble a one-way mirror.113
This approach would allow individuals to see and talk to the government
but ban the government from accessing individuals’ social-media data.

110

E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 208(b), 116 Stat. 2899, 2921.
Memorandum from Joshua B. Bolten, Dir. of Office of Mgmt. & Budget to the
Heads of Executive Dep’ts & Agencies, at Attachment A, Part II.E.2.f (Sept. 26, 2003),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda_m03-22/.
112 Id.
113 This Essay uses the image of a one-way mirror to help guide our thinking about the
government’s ability to use, collect, and distribute individuals’ personal information on
social-network sites. I recognize that the precise image of a mirror may not map perfectly
onto every nuance of the proposal. For instance, one could argue that government’s ability
to obtain individuals’ policy advice means that it has glanced back into individuals’ views.
Nonetheless, the image provides a powerful way to understand the extent to which
government can use its Government 2.0 sites to obtain personal information about
individuals.
111
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Individuals could examine government’s postings, participate in policy
discussions, and share their expertise with government. At the same time, a
one-way mirror policy would forbid government from using, collecting, or
distributing individuals’ list of contacts, wall musings, videos, photos, and
other social-media data.
Facebook’s fan pages resemble this approach. On Facebook, agencies
and corporations generate fans whose profiles remain largely inaccessible
to them. Those entities cannot view fans’ profiles, photographs, videos,
political and religious affiliations, and commentary. Unfortunately,
agencies and corporations can, however, view an abridged list of a
Facebook fan’s social contacts.114 A one-way mirror policy would prohibit
government from using or distributing that abridged list for any purpose,
such as the identification of a fan’s group associations.115
In short, this proposal creates a presumption of openness as to policyrelated matters and a presumption of privacy as to individuals’ socialnetwork information. Although it would require government to adhere to
this policy, it would not mandate third parties to alter their sites in any way.
This solution is a legal one, not a technical one.
This proposal could be pursued in various ways. Congress could adopt
legislation enshrining the one-way mirror policy into law.116 Alternatively,
the OMB could incorporate this proposal into its regulations.117 Agencies
could adopt it through policy statements or rulemakings.118
The
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has already taken the lead on
this issue, sponsoring an agency-wide conference on the privacy
implications of Government 2.0 and soliciting public feedback as well.119

114

Government could not view a fan’s entire list of contacts.
See notes 63–79 and accompanying text (discussing the privacy problems
associated with government’s use of social-media data to infer individuals’ group
associations).
116 See Geoffrey D. Kravitz, Short Essay and Book Note, REAL ID: The Devil You
Don’t Know, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 431, 445–46 (2009). This might be a particularly
fruitful time to consider legislative action, as privacy advocates such as the Center on
Democracy and Technology have devoted much time in thinking of ways to update the
Privacy Act to account for networked technologies. But, as Paul Schwartz notes, such
legislative change may come at too steep a price—the preemption of state privacy laws and
ossification of legislation. See Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J.
902, 929–30 (2009).
117 I thank Peter Swire for his helpful comments on how we might implement the oneway mirror proposal.
118 Of course, agencies should adopt technology-neutral policies to prevent
obsolescence. The policy should provide means for individuals to protest an agency’s
infringement of its terms.
119 Public Workshop Government 2.0: Privacy and Best Practices, 74 Fed. Reg. 17,876
115
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DHS could draft a privacy impact assessment incorporating the “one-way
mirror” policy, which other agencies might follow.
The one-way mirror policy would not, however, extend beyond
Government 2.0 sites, i.e., ones that aim to enhance governmental
participation, collaboration, and transparency as the “Open Government”
memorandum suggests.120 In other words, law enforcement would only be
prohibited from asking agencies for their Government 2.0 friends’ socialmedia data in cases where law enforcement identified agency friends as
criminal targets.121 The one-way mirror policy would not prevent law
enforcement from independently investigating publicly available socialnetwork profiles and blogs. Intelligence and law enforcement could
continue their efforts to infiltrate groups suspected of criminal activity
through social media.122 This policy only aims to commit Government 2.0
to its declared purpose—garnering public insight on policy matters. As the
next Section demonstrates, strong privacy rules will, in fact, advance that
effort.
Although this proposal looks to law to address Government 2.0’s
privacy risks, social-network sites have an important role to play here as
well. Sites like MySpace would be wise to adopt analogs of Facebook’s
fan pages, even though law would by no means require it. A particular
site’s adoption of fan pages for Government 2.0 efforts would surely
enhance user loyalty if stories, like Andy’s, emerge regarding
government’s misuse of social-media data on other sites. Facebook’s
competitors will ultimately follow its lead if they believe that users have a
taste for such fan pages.
B.

Promoting Democratic Participation and Transparency

The one-way mirror policy is crucial to produce the kind of engaged
citizenry that the President imagines in his Open Government initiative.
Deliberative democracy cannot thrive without strong privacy rules.123
Privacy allows speakers and listeners to feel that they can express
themselves without reprisal.124 It permits them to experiment with ideas.125

(Dep’t Homeland Sec. Apr. 17, 2009).
120 Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009).
121 In other words, law enforcement cannot contact the White House or other agency to
view a government friend’s profile (now criminal target) without legal process.
122 Law-enforcement agents could continue to pursue undercover operations online so
long as those operations comported with law.
123 Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 837
(2000).
124 Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609,
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Neil Richards explains that private intellectual exploration and confidential
communication protect our ability to develop new beliefs and to discover
new truths.126
Without privacy protections, democratic participation in cyberspace
may be elusive.127 Paul Schwartz cautions: “[W]ho will speak or listen
when this behavior leaves finely grained data trails in a fashion that is
difficult to understand or anticipate?”128 In other words, when “widespread
and secret surveillance becomes the norm, the act of speaking or listening
takes on a different social meaning.”129 As Joel Reidenberg contends, a
citizen’s right to participate in government depends upon the right to
privacy in her personal information.130
With strong privacy rules, individuals may be more inclined to
participate in Government 2.0. They might engage with government on
social-media sites and continue to watch videos in an uninhibited way.
Government’s online friends may be less likely to censor their postings and
would feel free to support unpopular groups or causes.131 This ensures that
individuals produce more informed discourse.132 Without a one-way mirror
policy, government may lose intelligent commentary from those who
appreciate Government 2.0’s privacy risks.
This proposal would play an expressive role as well. Beyond its
coercive power, law establishes a public set of meanings and shared
understandings between the state and the public.133 It educates the public

1651 (1999).
125 SOLOVE, supra note 51, at 79–80.
126 Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 416–17 (2008).
127 See Schwartz, supra note 123, at 837.
128 Schwartz, supra note 124, at 1651.
129 Id.
130 Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S.
Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 497–98 (1995).
131 Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at Copyright
Management in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1003–19 (1996) (arguing that digital
copyright–management technologies violate First Amendment freedom of speech and
thought).
132 Individuals’ personal information seems out of place in any discussion of the Open
Government initiative. Indeed, White House spokesperson Moira Mack remarked via email
“we are focused on opening government to the people (and not the other way around).” The
White House Is Now Following You on Twitter . . ., posting to The Podium (May 4, 2009),
http://internetinnovation.org/blog/entry/the-white-house-is-now-following-you-on-twitter/ .
This suggests that the White House and executive agencies have no interest in that
information.
133 Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1571 (2000).
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about the government’s values and commitments.134 In that way, the oneway mirror policy would express to the public that civic participation and
collaboration is its highest priority. It would communicate that government
will not compromise the goals of open government in pursuit of other aims.
This message seems crucial to dispel the public’s distrust in government,
something the Obama Administration seems eager to combat.
C.

Objections

Some will suggest that individuals have no privacy in information
divulged on social-network sites because they have turned the private into
the public by sharing it with others. The answer, however, is not that
simple. As the Supreme Court has recognized, the fact that information is
divulged to others “does not mean that an individual has no interest in
limiting disclosure or dissemination of the information.”135 Scholars like
Lior Strahilevitz have explored the pitfalls of drawing a sharp line between
what is public and what is private.136 Their criticism is particularly apt as
to social-network sites where privacy is “not simply about zeros and ones,
it is about how people experience their relationship with others and with
information.”137
Others will contend that people should know better, that once you
friend the President or a government agency, you have opened yourself up

134 Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2022 (1996); cf. Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender
Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 404–14 (2009) (exploring law’s expressive power in
conveying government’s commitments).
135 U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
770 (1989); see also Woodrow Hartzog, Promises and Privacy: Promissory Estoppel and
Confidential Disclosure in Online Communities, 82 TEMPLE L. REV. (forthcoming 2010),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1473561, at 8–13
(describing the disclosure of personal information in online communities and its potential
consequences).
136 Consider Lior Strahilevitz’s critique of the public disclosure tort, where an
individual’s sharing of information with a few people or, in some jurisdictions, with one
other person can waive a person’s expectation of privacy. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social
Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919 (2005). As Strahilevitz explains, a
restrictive view of privacy fails to capture how information actually flows in given
relationships. Id. In other words, a binary view of privacy—where disclosure to more than
one person eviscerates any privacy protection—cannot capture the fact that something may
be public vis-à-vis co-workers yet private vis-à-vis the outside world. Id. at 940.
Strahilevitz’s social-network theory would instead examine the actual structure of social
networks and the “extent of dissemination the plaintiff should have expected to follow his
disclosure of that information” to decide whether information would have become widely
known. Id. at 921.
137 boyd, supra note 90, at 18.
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to persistent surveillance.138 But as social-network research makes clear,
individuals often do not know better.139 They may be unable to distinguish
government agencies from distant acquaintances who they believe are not
watching their every move.140
Moreover, individuals may not appreciate the vastly different
consequences of friend-ing government agencies and individuals. If an
acquaintance sees something damning on an individual’s page and
discloses it to others, the individual might suffer reputational and emotional
harm for which he can pursue civil damages. If, however, a government
agency collects, uses, and distributes the information, the person may end
up under investigation, refused government benefits, or appear on a
government watch list. There may be no means to redress this breach of
trust. Individuals will be unable to grasp these differences and the privacy
risks that Government 2.0 poses.
Some may reject any attempt to limit government’s access to socialmedia data on the grounds that law enforcement can simply obtain the
information online from individuals whose privacy settings fail to protect
the data. In other words, technology has already decimated users’ privacy;
the genie cannot be returned to the bottle. Such technological determinism,
however, should not dictate policy. Warren and Brandeis rejected that sort
of thinking in their seminal article, The Right to Privacy.141 As Jeffrey
Rosen argues, we can make “social choices about how much privacy we as
a society think it is reasonable to demand.”142
Privacy officials have asked whether we should embrace a notice
regime along the lines of the Privacy Act, rather than adopting a flat ban on
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Danielle Citron, Why We Should Care About Privacy in a Government 2.0 World,
posting to Concurring Opinions (June 20, 2009, 18:05 EDT), http://www.concurring
opinions.com/archives/2009/06/why-should-we-care-about-the-privacy-implications-of-gov
ernment-20.html (Comment of Jake) (“If you put stuff on the Internet, expect people to read
it. Most folks who put stuff on the Internet probably expect this.”).
139 See supra notes 80–100 and accompanying text (discussing social-network users’
privacy expectations).
140 It may be more likely that individuals perceive government as more akin to distant
acquaintances than corporations they friend online. Individuals may be more likely to
appreciate that corporations have a profit motive to use their data. We expect Coca-Cola,
Amazon.com, or Verizon not to act in our best interests. On the other hand, we may get
confused as to the government’s motives and whether they are aligned with our own. Social
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141 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
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195 (2000).
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the use, collection, and distribution of individuals’ social-media data.143
On this view, the sole responsibility of the government is to make sure that
the social-media sites that they use have clear policies that tell consumers
what could be done with their information.144 James Grimmelmann views
this option as “completely unrealistic.”145 He suggests that people tend not
to appreciate notice.146 Although Facebook’s privacy policy bears a
TRUSTe seal, Facebook users “don’t read it, don’t understand it[, and]
don’t rely on it.”147 Thus, even if government agencies posted a wellwritten privacy policy on their Government 2.0 site, users are not likely to
be protected by it.
Conclusion
Government 2.0 presents exciting opportunities and serious challenges.
While social-media sites could attract more members of the public to
participate in agency policymaking, especially the digital-native generation,
they could erode privacy in ways that undermine the participatory goals of
open government. A one-way mirror policy would ameliorate that
problem, facilitating democratic discourse without engendering privacy
risks.
It also has potential uses beyond Government 2.0. Companies and
non-profit organizations might consider adopting one-way mirror policies,
either through technology or practice, when interacting with individuals on
social-network sites. This move would permit nongovernmental entities to
get the public’s feedback about their services while protecting their
privacy.

143

Martha Landesberg, Presentation at the U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security,
Government 2.0: Privacy and Best Practices Workshop 121, 140–41 (June 22, 2009),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_gov20_June2009_trans
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